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Relevant market definition remains a key element in the economic analysis of competition 
in the gasoline market. However, this is particularly difficult to undertake when 
competition is local and market power is geographically constrained, as they are in the case 
of the gasoline market. We analyse how the hypothetical monopolist or Small but 
Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices test performs when defining isochrones 
based solely on price information and the distance between competitors. We conclude that 
geographic information systems can be successfully employed in the precise definition of 
relevant geographic markets in the gasoline retail sector. Their application to the Spanish 
gasoline market indicates that the relevant geographic market is delineated by a five- to six-
minute travel-time isochrone around each station. Localised market power needs to be 
taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations on 
gasoline retailing. To drive competition in these local circumstances, markets need to be 
delineated on the basis of sufficiently small isochrones since only close rivals seem to 
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Relevant market definition is a key element in competition policy enforcement in the 
gasoline market, especially in the retail sector. Although estimation and simulation 
techniques allow market power to be studied directly without the need for market 
definition, defining markets and studying their concentration are likely to remain important 
policy tools for some time (see Brenkers and Verboven, 2006). Indeed, since estimation 
and simulation techniques remain overly reliant on assumptions regarding both demand 
and supply side primitives and on the equilibrium condition chosen, they are best used in 
conjunction with more traditional market definitions and concentration analyses. 
A number of studies can be found in the economic literature seeking to approximate the 
relevant markets for various sectors. Argentesi and Ivaldi (2007) for the printed media 
industry and Ivaldi and Lörincz (2011) for computer servers are two examples. However, in 
the case of the gasoline market, studies can be found that analyze the relevant geographic 
market only for the wholesale sector. Spiller and Huang (1986) show how refineries in the 
Northeastern United States compete in different relevant markets and how the more 
isolated refineries are able to exercise market power. Pinkse et al (2002) also analyze the 
wholesale gasoline market in the US, but employ a semiparametric estimator. They find 
that there is no global market for the whole country, but rather that every refinery 
competes with its neighbours. As such, the relevant geographic market is essentially local. 
Audy and Erutku (2005) apply different price tests in defining relevant markets in the 
wholesale gasoline sector of Canada. They report markets larger than cities but no bigger 
than the whole country. In fact, their results show the existence of more than two markets 
within Canada. 
Thus, although there is considerable empirical evidence of the size of the gasoline 
wholesale market, no empirical analyses have sought to determine the size of relevant 
geographic markets in the retail sector. Economic intuition suggests that such markets may 
be local, but we know nothing about their size. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to 
measure the size of these markets. Having done so, we also propose economic policy 
measures that might improve the level of competition within them. 
To measure the size of the relevant geographic markets in the gasoline retailing sector we 
have applied the Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices test (SSNIP test). 
This test is used by the competition authorities to define markets and makes the economics 
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of market definition more explicit. The US and EU merger guidelines currently use the 
SSNIP test to define markets. We have to take into account that the SSNIP test is only 
valid if firms compete in the market, and fails if firms have market power. This is known as 
the "cellophane fallacy" from the Du Pont case in 1956 (Sharma, 2011). The test measures 
whether a monopolist would be interested in introducing a permanent and significant price 
increase (of at least 5%) after acquiring rival firms. If the monopolist was interested, the 
products or outlets analyzed could be considered as lying within the same relevant market. 
Our aim is to identify the limits within which rivalry has beneficial effects for consumers. 
In this paper, we analyse how the SSNIP test performs when defining markets based on 
price information and on the distance between retail outlets. The competition between 
petrol stations can be considered a paradigmatic case of competition in local markets, 
presenting common characteristics of competition between retail outlets. There is growing 
interest in defining local markets on the basis of isochrones in order to examine retail 
rivalry (Office of Fair Trading 2005, Competition Commission 2003 and Baker 1999). The 
key issue in the study of local competition is determining how large these isochrones need 
to be in order to drive competitors in. 
Here, we conclude that geographic information systems can be successfully employed in 
the precise definition of relevant geographic markets. Applying the test to petrol stations, 
we find that relatively small isochrones drive enough competitors in and that local market 
power is greater than it is usually considered to be in cases of competition and retail 
regulation. Results show that the entry of new operators from different existing brands 
within a five to six-minute travel-time isochrone can significantly reduce the price. In 
relevant markets with more than one same brand station, the equilibrium price would be 
lower if one of the operators changed its flag, thereby increasing the number of 
competitors. Thus, removing the entry barriers that limit the number of operators and 
introducing policies to facilitate the change of flag can increase the level of competition and 
reduce the price equilibrium. 
Following on from this introduction, section 2 shows the theoretical relationship between 
the number of participants in the market and price equilibrium. Section 3 describes the data 
used here in applying this methodology to the case of competition between petrol stations 





2. Number of outlets and price equilibrium 
In this section we show that equilibrium prices in each relevant market depends directly on 
the number of sellers (petrol stations in our data), and whether those sellers belong to the 
same brand chain or to a rival brand chain. By contrast, we will show that equilibrium 
prices depend only indirectly on market size, as any shift in market size encourages more 
entry. 
In the petrol station industry, stations may be independent rivals or belong to a chain that 
resells gas provided by a major petrol brand or flag under an exclusivity contract. Although 
contract differ widely across countries, we will look closely at the case in which petrol 
stations under contract have no room to modify resell prices set by the brand owner for all 
stations using any resell price maintenance mechanism. 
We generalize the proposals by Gampbell and Hopenhayn (2005) that outline how market 
size has only an indirect impact on equilibrium pricing through its direct impact on the 
number of sellers. 
For distinguishing the impact of market size on entry, and then the effect of entry on 
pricing, we will model the entry game and the demand system using a multinomial logit 
model assuming that we have a limited number of spots available for entry in any given 
relevant market: let us say that there are potential locations which we will name by sub 
index j = 1,2, …, J. 
Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinshon & Pakes (1995) outlined the fundamentals of such 
discrete-choice models for analysing differentiated product markets with heterogeneous 
consumers. Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Argentesi and Ivaldi (2007) and Ivaldi and 
Lörincz (2011) discuss how to use them for defining relevant markets in antitrust cases. As 
discussed by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), multinomial logit demand systems fit 
perfectly on the theory literature analysing oligopoly models and outline similar 
propositions regarding the effects of competition on pricing behaviour and product 




First, we will look at the case in which there are no brand chains. All entrants are 
independent or have different flags to each other, and each firm has only one station 
(single-station firms) in the relevant market. Let   index whether there is entry in 
location j or not: a station is open to the public in location j , or there is not 
station open to the public in such location j . And, let the number of entrants be 
just the sum of such spot specific index:  . Super index r indicates that we 
focus first on the case in which all entrants are rivals, whether independent station or 
different brand stations. 
There will be entry in any spot whenever profits are non-negative, where profits in 
equilibrium are equal to the difference between prices and marginal costs at each 
spot, times the quantity sold at each spot , minus the fixed costs of entering at 
each spot . 
Each station total sales at the equilibrium are . Total sales depend on market size 
, the number of potential consumers at that relevant market. Total sales also depend 
on the shares of each and every actual station open in that market  for j = 1,2, …, J at 
the potential locations; j = 0 is the outside good, and  the share of potential consumers 
that finally are opting for the outside good, not consuming in any of the stations open to 
the public. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous with 
respect to their preference for consuming in one or other location, but they are 
homogeneous with respect their fuel needs just pumping a fixed and common amount of 
petrol when visiting the station. 
   (1) 
    (2) 
Assuming that each and every potential consumer in the relevant market, as in 
Bajari et al. (2010), form their expectations to find a shop in any of the J potential spots, 
according to the public information regarding profit functions, the market share at each 
and every location can be expressed by the multinomial logit probability function whenever 
consumer have utility functions like the following, in which there is a common mean utility 
that they obtain from consuming at each location , a common linear mean disutility 
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from paying the per unit price , and an idiosyncratic consumer specific taste for 
each location .  
As consumers will chose the option that maximize their expected utility among all 
the  j = 0,1,2,…, J options (including the outside good), the idiosyncratic consumer specific 
tastes distributes as an extreme value shock, and market shares equal the multinomial logit 
probabilities as follows:  
    (3) 
   (4) 
Finally, if entering firms maximize profits with respect to the prices they charge at 
their location post-entry, the system of equilibrium prices for single-station firms in the 
relevant market looks as follows, given that, in the multinomial logit demand system, the 
derivative of the market share with respect to the price is  : 
    (5) 
   (6) 
Post-entry equilibrium prices for the entrants are equal to marginal costs plus the 
inverse of the semi-elasticity of residual demand at each and every location. 
In this set up, it is clear cut that equilibrium sales at each potential location depend 
on the number of rival entrants as  as the index  is entering the 
market share denominator for all and every location that has finally an entrant at the 
equilibrium. 
Any increase in market size (M) will encourage entry through the profit function in 
equations (1) and (2) as long as equilibrium prices are larger than marginal costs, , 
and fixed costs are not too large :  . 
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And, equilibrium market shares at each location are decreasing with market size, as 
the increasing probability of having rivals when market size grows large, , increases 
the second term in the denominator in the market share function in equation (4), and 
therefore, decreases equilibrium market shares: . 
As market share decreases with entry of rivals driven by the larger market size, 
equilibrium prices decrease with the entry of rivals driven by market size grow, ,  as 
the elasticity of residual demand increases (the inverse of such elasticity decreases) in (5), 
and particularly in our simple but general utility equation set up outlined in this section, the 
denominator of the second term of the pricing function in (6) increases. 
This price drop by entry of rivals is driven by the fact that more entrants in the 
market reduce product differentiation among the outlets. So, firms cannot charge so large 
prices as consumers have more alternatives, and the market share of each competitor is 
smaller with more rival entrants in the market. Consumers chose the outlets closer to their 
idiosyncratic preferences. They do not have to move away to other more “distant outlets.” 
To attract them, all stores have to reduce pricing. 
Let us now, analyse the other extreme case. Let us assume that there is one 
incumbent brand firm that pre-empts entry from rivals by opening own brand stations at 
all the other spots available whenever profits are positive under the new stations ownership 
structure. So, we can then analyse how market size drives more own brand stores by the 
same firm in a completely free entry market. By so doing, we will analyse the impact of 
market size on own-firm multi-store number of entrants, , and pricing. 
Super index o indicates that we focus now on the case in which all entrants are under 
contract of the same major petrol firm and use the same flag or brand at the retail market. 
In this case, all the above equations remain but the pricing equation system for any 
maximizing profit chain that monopolizes a market by pre-empting entry of rivals and 
changing the full monopoly price looks like the following: 
    (7) 
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 Equilibrium price at each spot j is equal to marginal costs plus the inverse of the 
own price elasticity of residual demand at that spot, and also plus a term that takes into the 
price cost margins in other spots (sub indexed by the letter g) times how much of the 
market share lost at each spot j by a price increase at such spot j is captured by increasing 
market shares in other spots g= 1,2, …, G. 
   (8) 
As in equations (5) and (6), in equations (7) and (8), the second term of the pricing 
equation decreases with market size as market shares of incumbent decreases with entrants. 
This is the cannibalization effect of the new stations of the same brand with respect to the 
other stations.  
However, the new third term (the one including the sum of the cross price 
derivative of market shares) increases with respect to market size, as more entrants allow 
the chain to recoup consumers that were previously buying in outlet j by having them 
diverted toward stores g = 1,2, …, G  as consumers in any other station of the same brand 
(diversion effect). Additionally, with new entrants, some consumers that were opting for the 
outside good , may finally buy in the new stations (the market expansion effect in 
differentiated product markets). 
The impact of the entry of more stations of the same brand on equilibrium pricing 
depends on the magnitude of these two balancing effects. Second term or cannibalization 
effect is large when differentiation among stores is low. 
The third term has two components: 1) one is the diversion effect that compensates 
the cannibalization effect: the new stations attract consumers previously going to the other 
same brand incumbent stations; 2) the other is the market expansion effect, the new stations 
may attract consumers that before were opting for the outside good, as stations are located 
closer to all consumers “idiosyncratic” tastes. This is always positive as it is a new 
summand that gets larger and larger with more entry. 
As long as the diversion and market expansion effects more than compensate the 
cannibalization effect, entry of more stores of the same chain has a positive impact on pricing. 
So, with the increase in market size, more own brand multi-station pre-empting entry 
drives larger pricing: . 
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The shape of the effect however is not clear; it may be non-linearly convex as all 
those effects turn to be smaller at the margin as the market size grows and the number of 
entrants increase. Once all the available spots are occupy, market sixe increase has no 
longer any effect on equilibrium pricing. The effect is exhausted. 
For showing the effect of market size expansion in single-station, multi-station and 
mixed single and multi-station competition, we have simulated average pricing for a given 
set of parameters of the outlined model of simultaneous entry, market share and pricing 
system of equations in table 1 for a relevant market with 30 potential locations. 
We assume for the simulation that locations have  normalized unit constant mean 
attractiveness for potential consumers ( 30,...,2,11  jforj ), being the mean utility 
from consuming the outside good normalized to be zero as usual,  
We have assumed that marginal costs and fixed costs are all equal for all potential locations. 
This allows us to focus our attention on the impact of market size on entry, and also to 
show the impact of entry driven by this increase in market size on equilibrium pricing. 
Table 1 shows the number of entrants and pricing in different market equilibria 
combining one chain of petrol stations competing with a bunch of independent stations in 
which no other independent entrant may obtain non-negative profits, nor the opening of 
other own brand station by the chain increases its profits. We can see that pricing is larger 
in markets where one firm have more own brand stations (the highest price is in a market 
with 5 own brand stations plus 5 rivals with a price of 1.48), than in markets with a low 
level of own brand stations and a lot of rivals (the lowest price is in a market with 2 stations 
of the same brand and 13 single brand stations). 
Other characteristic that show table 1 is the positive relationship between market 
size and number of petrol stations.3 When the market size increase the number of petrol 
stations that enter in the market is greater.  
                                                 
3
 The effect of any difference in resident income across market is equivalent to the effect of a market 
expansion: it would drive higher prices and markups up to the point in which it would drive more entrants 









Rivals  Entrants 
 
Average Price 
1000 4 5 9 1,43 
1100 5 5 10 1,48 
1200 4 7 11 1,35 
1300 5 5 10 1,45 
1400 3 9 12 1,25 
1500 4 9 13 1,36 
1600 4 10 14 1,29 
1700 2 13 15 1,13 
1700 6 10 16 1,38 
1800 5 11 16 1,32 
1900 5 12 17 1,36 
2000 8 9 17 1,46 
2100 6 13 19 1,33 
2200 8 13 21 1,40 
2300 7 14 21 1,35 
2400 7 15 22 1,34 
 
00  ; 30,...,2,11  jforj .  
. 
Source: Author’s simulations. 
 
Using data from the above table we have estimated an econometric regression and, as 
shown in Table 2, results confirm the effects of the composition of the market on prices. 
The number of competitors has a negative and significant effect, while the number of own 
brand petrol stations has a positive effect. As regards the squared variables, the number of 
competitors is not significant, while the number of own brand petrol stations is negative 
and significant, indicating that the relationship between the number of own brand petrol 




















Robust Standard Errors within parentheses (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%). 
 
3. Data 
The SSNIP test is demanding in its data requirements. Not only do we need to know the 
price of a largely homogeneous product sold at different outlets, but we also need 
information about the geographic location of each of these outlets, the distance in time 
between them, and which outlets are under the ownership of which competing firms. 
Here, we use data from all 590 petrol stations with a roadside location (excluding motorway 
stations and those occupying a city or suburban location) in Catalonia, a region in the 
northeast of Spain with around 7,5 million inhabitants that occupies an area similar to that 
of Belgium or Massachusetts. Regular gasoline prices without taxes4 (unleaded 95 octane) 
sold at each outlet were obtained for the week of 31st July 2005 from the Ministry of 
Industry’s web page. All petrol stations were geographically located, and all distances (in 
terms of car journey time) from one petrol station to all other stations were computed 
                                                 




(348,100 time distances in total). We identified the petrol station brand: that is, the name of 
the gasoline firm owning the station or serving it via an exclusivity contract based on 
information available at the firms’ websites. All petrol stations not branded by one of the 
major firms are listed as being independent. We also obtained traffic density figures in the 
vicinity of each petrol station and population data in the neighbourhood of each station 
from the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (Idescat). 
Table 3 shows the distribution of petrol stations by brand and the mean and standard 
deviation of prices for each firm. 
Table 3. Number of roadside petrol stations and average prices by firm 
 
Brand 







Repsol 258 46.962 0.762 
Cepsa 84 46.511 0.908 
Galp 42 46.646 1.183 
Petrocat 35 47.031 0.534 
BP 29 46.747 0.600 
Shell 14 46.313 1.683 
Meroil 14 46.159 1.201 
Tamoil 10 46.936 1.217 
Saras 7 46.295 0.251 
Petromiraller 5 46.962 0.308 
ERG 4 45.962 0.896 
Supermarkets 3 41.249 2.215 
Independent 85 46.324 1.301 
Total 590 46.704 1.054 
Source: Based on information from the web pages of the Ministry of Industry and the major petrol firms. 
 
Based on these data, we computed a vector for each petrol station containing the number 
of rival brand outlets with which each competes in an isochrone (car travel-time) ranging 
from 1 to 15 minutes. We assume there to be no intra-brand competition, but we allow 
competition between independent petrol stations (i.e., between any outlets not owned or 
served by one of the major petrol players). The extent to which stations operating under an 
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exclusivity contract signed with one of the big petrol firms compete with each other is not 
clear. According to Contín et al (1998), most petrol stations under contract will earn a fixed 
percentage on final prices as set by the provider. Therefore, there is little or no room for 
outlets to modify the prices set by the brand owner in any coordinated fashion. 
Table 4 shows the total number of petrol stations in our database with rivals in each 
successive isochrone fixed from 1 to 15 minutes in a radius around each petrol station, and 
the mean number of rivals in each isochrone. The table also shows the number of markets 
in which no rival outlets are found within a given isochrone, and in these instances the 
number of markets in which there is more than one same brand outlet. As we can see in 
the table 2, up until isochrones of three minutes of distance time, the mean number of 
rivals is greater than the mean number of own brand outlets. It seems like own brand 
petrol station tend to be close but not too close when the market boundaries is at least 




Table 4. Market structure within isochrones 


































1  37 1.03 0.22 396 157 
2  113 1.15 0.96 311 166 
3  174 1.28 1.36 236 180 
4  255 1.62 1.84 179 156 
5  309 1.95 2.43 142 139 
6  362 2.24 3.13 114 114 
7  416 2.58 3.88 84 90 
8  442 3.10 4.70 65 83 
9  466 3.79 5.67 53 71 
10  475 4.34 6.79 50 65 
11  495 4.98 7.92 44 51 
12  509 5.64 9.11 32 49 
13  521 6.49 10.48 27 42 
14  530 7.27 12.02 22 38 




As suggested by the model in section 2, we estimate the impact of entry by rival brand 
outlets and by own brand outlets on equilibrium prices at each station. We estimated 15 
linear regressions to infer the impact of rivalry on equilibrium prices, which is the 
coefficient α1 in the following equation when defining the relevant market from 1 to 15 
minute isochrones: 
2
0 1 2 3
r o o
i i i i iP N N N          (9) 
where  i=1,2,...,590 petrol stations, riN is the number of rival outlets within the 1- to 15- 
minute isochrone, and oiN ,
2o
iN  is the number of petrol stations of the brand of outlet i 
within the isochrones and its square5. 
As discussed in section 2, the number of rivals and the number of same brand outlets 
within the isochrone is not exogenous because, in equilibrium, we expect the number of 
outlets to depend on market size (potential demand in terms of population and traffic 
flows) and on the number and variety of brands that are already in the market. We estimate 
the previous equations using not only OLS but also instrumental variables (IV) techniques 
using the brand of the nearest rivals, the population of the area in which each petrol station 
is sited and the Mean Daily Intensity (MDI) of the traffic on the road served as 
instruments. The population was calculated based on census data for the location of each 
service station and its surroundings, i.e., the number of people living in a radius extending 1 
to 15 minutes around the station. In this way, we assigned the population residing in the 
station’s defined market. The traffic intensity figure assigned to each service station was 
that recorded at a measurement point nearest to the station.6 
Table 5 shows the IV results. In the specification, standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and the correlation clustered geographically around roads. The error 
                                                 
5
 Results include the variable number of rivals squared are in the annex 1. We can see like results are less 
precise because there is not a large heterogeneity of number of rivals between petrol stations, so the two 
variables are very similar. 
6 The results are not significantly altered if we consider that traffic as a demand factor can also influence the 
equilibrium price. If there are barriers to entry that deter new operators when the traffic increases, then traffic 
may explain prices rather than the number of entrants. 
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term are clustered by road to take into account the possibility that the variance is different 
among roads but equal inside the same road. 
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Table 5. IV estimates 
2
0 1 2 3
r o o






iN . Instruments: population, dummy brand of closest rival, MDI. 



































































































Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
0.640 0.443 0.540 0.264 0.321 0.773 1.122 0.777 
















































































































































1.181 1.443 1.486 1.990 1.722 2.460 2.358 












































Robust Standard Errors within parentheses (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%). 
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As Table 5 shows, almost all estimates are jointly significant at 1% and the instruments 
used are valid (as indicated by the Overidentification Hansen J Statistic)7, at least in the 
range between 5 and 8 minutes, where the p-value of the Overindentification Hansen J 
Statistic is between 0.5705 and 0.3338. When the market is wider the validity of the 
instruments is smaller although the p-value is never below 0.05. The F test of the first stage 
shows that instruments are jointly significant at 1%, but the results of the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic are not so positive. As shown in the above table this statistic show that our 
instruments are weak which could not partially solve the problem of endogeneity, causing 
an attenuation bias in our estimates. This attenuation bias suggest that the results presented 
should be understood as a lower bound estimate of the effect of the number of 
competitors and own brand petrol stations on price. 
As expected, the effect of rivals on equilibrium prices is negative and statistically significant 
at 1% in most cases, and the effects range from 1.24 euro cents in the market of 5 minutes 
to 0.18 cents if we define the market in 15 minutes. Additionally, as the isochrones become 
larger the effect of an additional competitor weakens. This result shows that the effect of 
having a close competitor is greater than that of having a competitor located at a greater 
distance. 
Additionally, having more same outlet brands in the vicinity has a positive and significant 
impact on prices, as suggested by the theoretical model in section 2, but only after 8 
minutes distance. As the number of own brand outlets in the vicinity increases, the greater 
is a brand’s market power, and have a positive impact on the price equilibrium. We can also 
observe that the coefficients are not significant for the first 8 minutes of distance. The 
reduced variation that exists in the first minutes can explain this result, making our 
simulations more imprecise. 
Using the estimates of the impact of rivals on equilibrium prices, we conduct the 
hypothetical monopolist test: we compute the likely mean increase in prices if a rival in a 
each isochrone merges with a hypothetical monopolist. Having defined our objective 
function, we can make the following estimation: 
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0( , , ) ( | , , )
r o o r o oh N N N E p N N N  (10) 
                                                 
7 For an in-depth analysis of instruments, see Staiger & Stock (1997) and Stock & Yogo (2002). 
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We obtain our best price prediction if we convert all rival gas stations to same brand 
pumps: 
2
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
ˆ( 0, , * )r o o r o o oh N N N N N N N     (11) 
In this way we can calculate the increase in prices when moving from the current balance 
to the hypothetical market monopolization when the market is defined in different forms: 
2
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1
0
ˆ( 0, , * )
ˆ
r o o r o o oh N N N N N N N p
p
p
    
    (12) 
Table 6 shows the test results when simulating the prices under monopoly. Column 1 
shows the average price in the market while column 2 shows the average price equilibrium 
if one firm monopolizes the market. In column 3 we show the effect of monopolization in 
percentage terms. It is clear that the market for which monopolization causes a Small (5%) 
but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) is that defined by a five- to 






















1 46.70414 46.39005 -0.7 
2 46.70414 48.12614 3.0 
3 46.70414 47.96809 2.7 
4 46.70414 47.37012 1.4 
5 46.70414 49.34349 5.7 
6 46.70414 49.16338 5.3 
7  46.70414 48.86589 4.6 
8 46.70414 48.84147 4.6 
9 46.70414 48.10535 3.0 
10 46.70414 48.17785 3.2 
11 46.70414 48.2289 3.3 
12 46.70414 48.17678 3.2 
13 46.70414 48.32711 3.5 
14 46.70414 48.1992 3.2 
15 46.70414 48.2785 3.4 
 
Graphs 1 and 2 show how the effect of monopolization weakens as the isochrone is 
extended, falling below the 5% threshold recorded for a travel time of 5 and 6 minutes. 
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Graph 1. Increase in prices by the hypothetical monopolist in cents Euro (€) 
 
 
Graph 2. Percentage increase in prices by the hypothetical monopolist 
 
 
Regarding that the increase in prices generates an increase in profits and also that this 
increase will be “non-transitory”, we must clarify two aspects. 
 
It is true that we are assuming that the increase in prices will result in increased profits, so 
the monopolization of the market would bring no additional cost. This would make the 
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monopolization of the market became profitable. We believe that there are not reasons to 
believe that the monopolization of the market will cause an increase in costs. Indeed it 
would be reasonable to think that increasing their market share even increase their 
purchasing power and costs could be reduced. 
 
Regarding the change should be “non-transitory” we want highlight two aspects. On the 
supply side, when one brand monopolizes the market, there is not enough demand to allow 
entry of a new station. Even if increased demand enough to let a new operator, the time it 
takes to open a new service station is high, often exceeding one year. On the demand side, 
it is true that mobile apps and GPS allow information on fuel prices at an ever lower cost. 
However it should be noted that change the gas station to refuel not only have the cost of 
obtaining information to know which petrol is cheaper, but also has a cost of time, and 
therefore money, to travel to the cheapest gas station . This cost increases as additional 
displacement is greater, and can easily exceed the savings of refueling at a cheaper price. 
Therefore, the increase in prices that would occur when a brand monopolizes the market 
could be considered as “non-transitory” 
This result has important policy implications both for the analysis of potential mergers and 
when implementing measures to promote competition. 
When contemplating mergers, our results indicate that the relevant geographic market 
definition, which is essential to observe the evolution in concentration, must take into 
account the local nature of the gasoline retailing market. Traditionally, gasoline markets 
have been defined ad hoc, giving much larger market sizes than those indicated by the 
results reported here. An excessively broad definition of the relevant geographic market 
may mean the actual effects of a merger are not appreciated. 
As for the measures to promote competition, these should impact the market structure 
within a five- to six-minute travel-time isochrone and not across the board. Two main 
measures can be implemented to boost competition: first, facilitating the entry of new 
operators, that is, of petrol brands other than those already established, within markets 
defined by a five- to six-minute isochrone. To facilitate this, potential barriers to entry in 
the market need to be identified and eliminated. Such entry would increase the number of 
rivals, which in turn would increase the level of competition and reduce the level of market 
prices. Second, measures are needed to facilitate the change of flag operators. If a market 
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has more than one gas station under the same flag within the 5- to 6-minute isochrone, 
changing one flag would increase competition and reduce price levels. 
In our empirical study of the 590 petrol stations comprising our sample, 228 do not have 
any competitor within a six-minute radius, which allows them to set significantly higher 
prices. The entry of new petrol stations of different flags, other than those already 
established, would increase competition and reduce the level of equilibrium prices. Among 
these 228 stations with no competitors, 114 stations have a petrol station of the same 
brand within this six-minute boundary. For these 114 petrol stations, changing the flag of 
one of them would bring about an increased level of competition and reduce the 
equilibrium price. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Geographic market definitions for merger and entry regulations tend to be too broad to 
take into account the fact that competition is only effective if outlets are located sufficiently 
close to each other. Traditional analyses of geographic markets have relied on techniques 
such as price correlations or chain of substitutions that are unable to identify how the 
interaction between outlets is eroded by distance. 
We conclude that geographic information systems can be successfully employed in the 
precise definition of relevant geographic markets. In the case of petrol stations, we show 
that relevant markets are delineated by a five- to six-minute car travel-time isochrone 
centred on each petrol station. In each isochrone, it is easy to exert localised market power 
without competition. To drive competition in these local circumstances, markets need to 
be delineated on the basis of sufficiently small isochrones since only close rivals seem to 
compete effectively with each other. 
This result should prove useful to policymakers. First, in contemplating merger cases, 
defining the relevant geographic market is crucial. An excessively narrow or broad 
definition of the market can mean significant effects are overlooked and wrong decisions 
might then be taken. Second, if the aim is to introduce measures to increase competition in 
the markets, then the local nature of competition between gas stations must be taken into 
consideration. Thus, we conclude that the elimination of potential entry barriers can 
facilitate the market entry of new operators at a distance defined by a car travel-time of five 
to six minutes. This would result in an increased level of competition and a reduction in the 
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equilibrium prices, while measures designed to help retailers change brand would further 
add to the competition in the market. 
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Annex 1. Estimations with the variable number of rivals squared 
 
Table A1. IV estimates 
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iN . Instruments: population, dummy brand of closest rival, MDI. 



































































































































































































































































































0.396 0.634 0.610 0.526 0.610 0.684 1.226 




























































Robust Standard Errors within parentheses (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%). 
 
